This year, cracks began to appear in the myth that the FARC was unbeatable on the battlefield. For the first time in 40 years of conflict, the FARC Secretariat suffered some mortal blows. Serious command, control, and loyalty problems among their ranks were brought to light. They received a historic slap by the Colombian military in “Operation Checkmate,” in which former presidential candidate Íngrid Betancourt and other hostages were freed in a daring rescue. All of their political calculations with regards to their hostages turned out poorly. If that weren’t enough, “Tirofijo,” the head of the FARC, this year really did die.
The question that remains is if the beating that the FARC has received and the Colombian military’s achievements are temporary episodes or if they mark a strategic trend and thus a change of balance in the confrontation.
Nobody- not the government, academics, the Americans nor the very FARC Secretariat-is clear about just how weakened the FARC is militarily. It’s evident that they are withdrawing their forces and that they are on the defense. But in a long-term war, this does not necessarily mean defeat. However, even sectors sympathetic to the insurgency acknowledge that the guerillas have clearly lost the battle for the support of the Colombian people. The most forceful demonstration of their political isolation was the February 4th march, promoted by the government, in which 10 million people turned out to protest against kidnapping.
The FARC lost the initiative in the war, but thought that they could overcome this retreat by recuperating political initiative through a humanitarian exchange proposal. The year began with the FARC making headlines, convinced that they had a long-term agenda, pushed by the enthusiasm of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. The calculation of the FARC was to build an international setting that would put President Álvaro Uribe against the ropes and launch a negotiation platform that would give the guerillas their yearned-for room for political negotiation. But nobody could have predicted that things would turn out so badly for the insurgency. Although at the request of Chávez and Senator Piedad Córdoba the liberation of seven hostages was achieved, those same liberations highlighted the internal communications weaknesses within the FARC and, worse, the serious command and control problems.
First was the Emmanuel episode. Emmanuel, the son of Clara Rojas who was born in captivity, was promised to be released without them even knowing that he was not even in their hands. In March came the attack against “Raúl Reyes” in Ecuadorian territory, which not only was remarkable for him being the first member of the FARC Secretariat to die as a result of an attack by the Colombian military but also because his death left a big part of the international strategy of the FARC hanging in the balance.
The FARC’s international strategy is considered to be a strategic flank in their military activities because of the access it provides to border areas, and because it is a critical element of its political strategy. From that bombardment, the government obtained a powerful information and propaganda weapon: the computer of “Reyes,” which neutralized much of the international support that the guerrillas had abroad.
During that dark March, a second member of the Secretariat died, killed by this own guard, during a bloody event that revealed morale cracks in sectors of the FARC. If that weren’t enough, the legendary guerrilla leader “Tirofijo” would also die, not from combat but rather of old age. “Operation Checkmate” was yet another severe blow to the FARC, as they were fooled by the military and lost 15 hostages including Íngrid Betancourt and three U.S. citizens. With the operation, they lost their most important prize for a possible humanitarian exchange.
Without the possibility of a humanitarian exchange, the guerillas’ political agenda was reduced to an exchange of letters with intellectuals. That is paradoxical for the guerillas who have always scoffed at those who didn’t speak in militaristic terms. On the military front, according to the observatory of the Corporación Nuevo Arco Iris, a think tank, the FARC have significantly increased the number of mined fields and snipers. Those are lethal dangers for Colombian forces, but it does not give the guerillas any significant military advantage.
Nevertheless the current moment is very difficult for the FARC. The military has tasted the fruits of success and for the first time the guerillas are suffering defeats. The government cannot rest on their laurels because of their successes at the very time it is necessary to imagine how the end game will play out. Those who believe that the military effort can be sustained forever and that the agony of the FARC will be gradual perhaps will be mistaken. The current economic crisis makes the current level of government military spending unsustainable. In realistic terms, it’s not feasible to annihilate the guerillas or make them become completely irrelevant. Although the word negotiation for many sounds like capitulation, more than its banishment what is needed is a reinvention of the negotiation concept.
In Colombia, a scene of dialogue like that of the Caguán, the former demilitarized zone that was handed over to the FARC, is no longer possible, especially because there isn’t a climate of favorability for it. But neither is it realistic to think that the FARC will undertake demobilization like the paramilitaries did, and much less, surrender. Without a doubt, the subject of dialogue and how to put an end to the war, in which the government now has a clear and surely irreversible advantage, will be at the center of debate next year when the presidential campaign begins in earnest. The clichéd phrase that the policy of democratic security has to be re-elected does not resolve a new question planted in 2008: and after debilitating the FARC, then what?