Until just recently, President Álvaro Uribe had been considered an illuminated politician. With his face of a seminarian, his speech full of folksy diminutives and his authentic paisa (someone from the department of Antioquia) qualities, he has gained a unique position in the hearts of most Colombians. That ability of being close to the people has made him the most popular president in the last 50 years. The combination of paternalism, micromanagement and discipline has turned him into an uncommon phenomenon: a president beloved just as much by the people as by the ruling class.
But all of this has been gradually changing during the last few days. The prolonged ambiguity about his re-election has diminished the enthusiasm for it. Also, the wear and tear of being in power for eight years is beginning to have an effect.
Uribe is still a very popular president, but at least for the ruling class he is no longer considered a political genius. Colombia has traditionally been a country of institutions, which is considered by experts as a national heritage. The economic, political and intellectual elites in the country reject the rule by caudillos or chieftains (caudillismo) so common in the majority of the countries in the continent. The concept of a strong or providential man is not deep-rooted in the country. In his first re-election, Uribe was able to neutralize this anti-caudillo sentiment with his triumphs against the guerrillas. Another argument in favor of re-election was that one four-year term was too short and thus a constitutional reform was worthwhile in order to solve the problem.
These considerations are not valid when it comes to the second re-election. The experience of the presidential systems have shown that eight years is more adequate than 12. Reforming the Constitution for the second time for Uribe lacks all sense in institutional terms. The only justification would be that of the providential man, invoking emotional factors of the leader and of the masses, considerations that are totally alien to a contemporary developed state. The fact that President Hugo Chavez is doing exactly the same illustrates shows how inconvenient this is.
Until last week it could be argued that all of these re-electionist fits were the product of a court of courtiers who authentically believed that Uribe was an irreplaceable man for the nation. The president appeared to be uninvolved, but it was hoped that his realism and his sense of self-criticism would not compromise him in that adventure. With the statement of the minister of the interior and of justice last week saying that the government liked the referendum, that hope vanished.
The majesty of the presidency also disappeared in the forceful way in which the decree of the calling for extra sessions in Congress in order to debate the re-election issue into reality was made. It had always been thought that because of simple reasons of political modesty that the president would not allow for extraordinary sessions to be called only for the reason of perpetuating himself in power. The fact that he did so showed that the ambiguity of Uribe on the matter did not obey a transitory strategy of ensuring governability as had been speculated, but rather a concrete interest in clinging to power.
This revelation came about in a lamentable fashion. A constitutional reform of this magnitude should be the subject of a treatment worthy of its stature. What was seen last week was more the product of an approval without discussion by some authoritarian majorities rather than by national consensus. The pretense that the referendum was an act of popular initiative behind the back of the president was erased. Luis Guillermo Giraldo’s referendum became the government’s referendum. Six ministers were present in the Congress supporting the initiative. They were situated like praetorian guards around the president of the House of Representatives in order to control all of his words and movements. An advisor of the secretary general of the presidency, list in hand, made a note of the parliamentarians who were present. “She is here to tell Bernardo Moreno if we have voted in favor or not so that perhaps the government will be able to take reprisals against us,” one congressperson said. Two other advisors were stationed at the door to prevent that any key vote could escape. The second re-election of Uribe, which began out of the will of the constituency, became a maneuver by the majority Uribista coalition in the Congress herded by the government.
What is surprising from this whole process is that it would have made more sense if the second re-election of Uribe were assured. But it isn’t. Up until now the only thing that has happened is that in the four required debates to give the referendum life, two have been approved, those debates in the House of Representatives. Going forward, it has to be approved in two debates in the Senate, one in the first commission and then on the Senate floor. In addition, a certification by the Consejo Nacional Electoral, the national election board, is required to show that all the procedures in the referendum process including financing were done according to the law. After that, the legal backing of the Constitutional Court is necessary. And, last but not least, 7.3 million Colombians will have to vote so that Uribe has the right to run for a second re-election.
Each of these steps has its own obstacles. The approval in the two debates in the Senate will be more difficult to obtain than in the House of Representatives. Privately the majority of the senators of the government coalition who support it publicly no longer believe in it. Also, the certification by the electoral board does not look to be easy if it is taken into consideration the lack of clarity in the accounts. The judge charged with the case has detected on a preliminary basis accounting irregularities and a lack of respect for the limits required by law.
At the Constitutional Court the situation is not less complicated. Each time that a current or future member expresses his support for the Constitution of 1991, he is implicitly letting it be known that he would oppose a third term for Uribe. Up until now there are few judges who have not sent this message. While the government can influence the court’s decisions, its room to maneuver is limited compared to Congress. The court without a doubt will have Uribista judges, but they are conscious that the independence of this organism and their individual prestige as a judge depends on how they decide this matter.
In addition, in order for the court to give the green light to Uribe’s second re-election it would have to change its precedent, according to which in order to protect the balance of powers, there can only be one immediate re-election.
If it comes to this next to last step, the obstacle of 7,300,000 votes that it must produce still remains. It is not evident that there will be that number of Uribistas available to head to the polls on that day. Maybe it will help their cause that they are thinking about holding the re-election referendum on the same day as the other two referendums that are on the table. Those are the referendum on life sentences for those who abuse children and the referendum on the right to drinking water. Joining the re-election referendum with two causes that are so popular, the re-election referendum could achieve greater participation.
The problem of 2014 is added to all that. Neither the 4,300,000 people who signed in favor of the referendum, nor Uribe himself, are interested that he leaves power in 2010, leaving a door open in case the country needs him in the future. However, the referendum text remains incorrectly worded and it is not sure that that error can be corrected. The government will try to change the date for 2010 in the two debates that are approaching in the Senate. But that attempt has already been made in the House of Representatives and it failed.
As the majority of the Uribista congresspeople deep down no longer believe in the second re-election, the way in which to please all sides is by supporting the original text that was presented to the people. In this way it could be argued that even if there had been an error, legally what was approved cannot be modified. That legalistic excuse to block the re-election could be invoked not only by Congress but also by the Constitutional Court, many of whose members have the same reservations as the Uribistas.
The reality is that the referendum is being advanced under pressure and a good part of who is supporting it in the Congress and at the Constitutional Court are doing so more out of reasons of loyalty than out of conviction. That same skepticism extends not only to the economic sector but also to several of the most important government officials. People like Juan Manuel Santos, Noemí Sanín and Andrés Felipe Arias, who publicly have to profess their support for a third term, are praying inside that the initiative fails as soon as possible in order to launch their own candidacies.
Among public opinion, the trend isn’t very promising. According to the latest survey by Gallup, the number of people who want Uribe to be able run again in 2010 has dropped significantly. In just four months he has lost 14 points from those who support re-election. He went from 69 % in August to 55 % last Friday in the Gallup poll.
The insistence of continuing with the referendum leaves the impression that Uribe is somewhat unaware of the political and economic realities that have arisen in 2008. His popularity is still very high, but the ruling class now wants a change. It is true that an election can be won with the support of the masses and the skepticism of the ruling class. But this would not be a fresh start nor a good omen for governability from there onwards.
What was once believed to be unthinkable cannot be discarded: that after a strong recession in 2009 and in the midst of some adverse economic circumstances, the providential man could be defeated at the ballot box. It happened to Churchill immediately after he had won the war against Hitler. It happened to former Bogotá mayor Enrique Peñalosa as he ran once again for mayor of the capital last year. None of these outcomes would be a good way to end one of the most successful political stories in the history of Colombia.