On Thursday, Caracol Radio Station told its listeners that President Alvaro Uribe would expose incontrovertible evidence of the presence of FARC and ELN commanders in Venezuela. More than one was shocked by the news. Not so much by its content—it’s a known fact that there’s guerrilla presence in Venezuelan territories—but more by the chosen moment for making it public.
A day before, Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez had approved a meeting between his foreign minister, Nicolás Maduro, and Colombia’s designated equivalent, María Ángela Holguín. Expectations grew around the fact Chavez might even attend Juan Manuel Santos’ presidential possession, once his most fierce critic, on august the seventh.. Holguín had already stated that her priority was to normalize the relations with the neighbors.
One doesn’t have to be an expert in international relations to anticipate a major disturbance and a fierce reaction from Chavez government if such a denouncement was made. It had already happened in the past. There isn’t anything that bothers President Chávez more than being accused of collaborating with Colombian guerrillas. In less than 24 hours, Venezuela’s president had already recalled his ambassador in Bogotá, and had insulted Uribe, whom he referred to as a “gangster” once again. Meanwhile, Uribe met Colombias’s Army Generals and his Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministers, to study Venezuela’s reaction and to prepare an answer, which was read at 5 o’clock by Uribe’s Press Secretary, César Mauricio Velázquez. In a letter addressed to the Organization of American States (OAS), Colombian government demanded “an extraordinary session at the Permanent Council, to examine the presence of Colombian terrorists in Venezuelan territory”.
The plans President-elect Santos had on initiating his government with calm waters in the region were destroyed in a glimpse. His Latin-American tour, to begin next 21st in Mexico, takes a different background in which security—not trade and investment, as was programmed—will dominate its media coverage.
Even if bringing the FARC-in-Venezuela issue to international grounds generates applause among some, this is neither the right timing nor the way to do the accusations. President Uribe is today what Americans call a ‘Lame-duck’: his influence is minimal and his Latin-American counterparts are interested in gaining his successor’s trust rather than his. Even more being that they feel Santos and Holguín represent a return of the usual Colombian diplomacy of dialogue rather than confrontation.
If the governments in the region did not support Colombia back in April 2008 when Uribe’s administration attacked a FARC camp in Ecuador and revealed e-mails and documents that compromised Hugo Chavez as guerrilla-friendly, they won’t do so now. They’re used to ignoring Colombian complaints after hearing them. Same happens with the scuffle between the two leaders. They prefer a façade diplomacy rather than theatrical arguing.
It is a tradition that the OAS does not interfere in troubles between two of its members. OAS’ philosophy advocates for consensus, not fighting. Uribe exposes Colombia to diplomatic humiliation by asking the Permanent Council to take side on the guerrilla-in-Venezuela issue. While Venezuela is already granted with its Alba companions support—Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador—Colombia can only count on the United States. It’s always been like this during Uribe’s government, and that’s precisely what Santos is trying to change for his.
Both Chávez and as his foreign minister highlighted differences between Uribe and Santos. Taking advantage of the situation, they have even accused the Colombian president of conspiring against his former Defense Minister, Juan Manuel Santos. It’s the old strategy of ‘divide and rule’.
Gabriel Silva, Colombia’s current Defense Minister, explained why president Uribe revitalized the controversial guerrilla-issue with Venezuela. He said the President wanted to make it clear that bi-national relations were deteriorated due to the neighboring country’s lack of commitment in fighting terrorism. According to the government’s thinking, it’s impossible to maintain good relations with a country that allows guerrillas in its’ territory.
It’s an irony that from 2002 to 2007 such was Uribe’s policy. He held his anger, and excepting the crisis driven by Rodrigo Granda’s capture in Caracas, relations between Colombia and Venezuela couldn’t have been better for business. Colombian exports to that country increased from USD $1,1 billion in 2002 to $6 billion in 2008. Several integration agreements were even signed.
Chavez’ mediation to achieve the humanitarian agreement, and the information on Raul Reyes’ computer generated a twist in the relations between the two presidents. Both have radicalized positions and have found reasons to increase frictions towards each other. The result was the collapse of bi-national trade: until may, this year’s exportations barely reached USD $650 million. And the guerrillas, as noted by Bogotá, are still settled there, taking safe haven across the border.
It’s quite clear that the ‘microphone diplomacy’, so fashionable in recent years, does not work. That is the conclusion Holguin and president-elect Santos seems to have reached to. They want to recover the past’s pragmatism, back in Uribe-government’s early years, when Holguín was Colombia’s ambassador in Caracas.
It would be better if the current President made things easier for them. In the United States, the outgoing President is always careful to keep his successor informed of national interest issues. It was done so by George W. Bush with Barack Obama and the global financial crisis, and by Bush father as well, when in 1992 he consulted president-elect Bill Clinton about sending troops to Somalia.